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Historical Side Lights on Some Constitutional Provisions
BYRON BEATTY SERVIES.
During the last three hundred years, a belt about a thousand miles wide,

stretching entirely across North America, has been peopled with one hundred and ten million souls. This belt represents the geographical limits of
one of the world's greatest powers. At the beginning of this period the
population of this area, both Indian and white, was about five hundred thousand. Since that time a few struggling settlements on the eastern seaboard
grew into prosperous colonies which in turn, after throwing off foreign allegiance, have grown in three centuries to that expanse and populousness which
the Roman Empire at its height attained only after ten centuries. Many
causes have contributed to make the United. States in their collective capacity
the nation it now is. Among these was that good sense which enabled the
inhabitants of the thirteen original states to profit by their own and the experiences of the old world, and which prompted them or their representatives
to embody those experiences in the great instrument which so richly deserves
the encomiums showered upon it. Whoever scans the notes of the constitutional convention as written down by Madison, Yates, Hamilton and others
at the time, is struck with the frequency of reference which the delegates
made to the British unwritten constitution and its historical development.
They used it as a guide, both negatively and positively. It is my intention
in this brief sketch to show a few (and necessarily only a few) historically
interesting particulars wherein the framers of the Constitution turned to account and reaped the fruit of England's political experiences by codifying
and inserting them in our basic law. An examination of the notes referred
to will show except in one instance an almost unanimous assent to the insertion of the provisions herein discussed.
The Constitution is not the result of purely fortuitous circumstances. Its
principles are based on conclusions drawn from wide experience in the affairs
to which they relate. The form of it is the result of four months of the most
extensive thought bestowed by an assembly of infant America's most profound thinkers, and its substance is the crystalized wisdom of many centuries.
The original instrument as ratified by the several states and put into operation
in 1789, and the first ten amendments thereto adopted shortly thereafter,
contain many provisions directly traceable in English history. Among these
are the provisions requiring bills for revenue to originate in the House; directing the President to give information to Congress concerning the state
of the nation; against the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus except
in certain cases; against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws; for the
definition of treason and a rule of evidence to prove it; against the establishment. and maintenance of a state religion and religious tests for public office;
for jury trials; for the rights of free speech and free press; for the rights to
bear arms and to petition the government and against taking private property
without compensation. Owing, however, to the space into which this article
must be compressed our discussion will be confined, first, to the historically
interesting and kindred provisions against bills of attainder together with
the treason clause; second, the provisions against religious tests for office
and the establishment of a state religion and third, the clause forbidding,
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with certain exceptions,.thc suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Fxcept
in one instance these clauses arc now of historical rather than practical interest,
but, as it is said in the Constitution of Ilinois "a frequent recurrence to the
fundamental principles of civil government is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty," we hope that this recurrence to some of them
will'in a measure be beneficial in that respect.

Bills of Attainder.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment for the
commission of a crime (real or supposed) without j1idicial trial; and treason,
at common law, consisted generally in subversive acts against the government,
attempts on the life of the King or the royal family and war against the
King in his realms. The theory of the so-called unwritten constitution of
England is that the will of Parliament evidenced by an act duly passed is
the supreme law of the land. There is consequently no restriction of the
power of Parliament preventing the passage of obnoxious laws which in
this country would be unconstitutional. But since the time of the last of
the Stuarts Queen Anne (1702-1714), Parliament has rarely abused itsabsolute
power. The privilege of the elective franchise has since those days been
extended generally to the masses, and if Parliament should now attetnpt
to pass such legislation every member who voted for it would soon lose
his seat. The check on Parliament is therefore political rather than judicial.
In the days, however, when P5arliament was much under the dominion of the
throne such laws were of frequent occurrence andwere used to rid the prevailing party of its strongest political opponents. Such legislation is not
necessarily to be condemned only because of failure of substantial justice in
many cases, but because of the tendency that such a mode of justice be used
by unscrupulous persons for their own ends. The case of Sir John Fenwick
is illustrative of this tendency.
Sir John was one of the conspirators who had plotted to kill William III.
There were only two witnesses who had knowledge of the plot and Fenwick's
connection therewith. Under the common law rule which was later written
into our Constitution, two witnesses were necessary to the same overt act.
While he was in prison awaiting trial for high treason, it was noised'abroad
that his wife and friends had bribed one of the witnesses to leave England..
Parliament ordered an investigation -which revealed that such was the truth
and accordingly some one in the Commons brought in a bill of attainder
against Fenwick. In fairness to the members of the then existing Parliament
it may be said that a thorough sifting of all the evidence (much legally inadmissible however), against the prisoner was made before the passage of the
bill took place. The bill, the last of its kind in England whereby a person
was condemned to death, was carried by a narrow margin of thirty-ithree
votesin the Commons and a narrower one in the House of Lords.
There is now no doubt about the accused's complicity in the act of treason
attributed to him but the objection of thinking persons (and it was the greatest
argument in the defendant's favor on the floor of both houses) is the substitution of a legislative act for a judicial function. Macaulay, in commenting
on Fenwick's case, points out the fairness and advisability of a judicial rather
than a legislative mode of trial in political cases. "The pri soner is allowed
to challenge any number of jurors with cause and a considerable number
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without cause. The twelve, from the moinent at which they are invested
with their short magistracy, till the rhoment when they lay it down, are kept
separate from the rest of the community. Every precaution is taken to prevent any agent of power from soliciting or corrupting them. Every one
.of them must hear every word of the evidence and every argument used
on either side. The case is then summed up by a judge who knows that,
if he is guilty of partiality, he may be called to account by the great inquest
of the nation. In the trial of Fenwick at the bar of the House of Commons
all these securities were wanting. Some hundreds of gentlemen, every one
of whom -had much more thav half made up his mind before the case was
opened, performed both the fOnctions of judge and jury. They were not
restrained as a judge is restrained, by the sense of responsibility; for who
was to punish a Parliament? They were not selected, as a jury is selected,
in a manner which enables the culprit to exclude his personal and political
enemies. The arbiters of his fate came in and went out as they chose. They
heard a fragment here and there of what was said against him and a fragment
here and there of what was said in his favor and during the progress of
the bill they were exposed to every species of influence. In the debates
arts were practised and passions excited which are unknown to well constituted tribunals but from which no great popular assembly divided into
parties ever was or ever will be free. If the life of the most worthless man
could be sported with thus, was the life of the most virtuous man secure?"
To provide against such a species of legislative justice, the framers of
the Constitution defined therein the crime of treason and wisely inserted the
clause against bills of attainder. To see how great that foresight was, one
has only to consider the trial of Aaron Burr as it was before a regularly
constituted tribunal and speculate what it might have been on the floor of
Congress if no such provision had existed in the Constitution when his trial
took place.
The Free Exercise of Religion.
Government, some one has said, exists primarily for the purpose of keeping
the peace, for the purpose of compelling citizens to settle their differences
and disputes by arbitration instead of settling them by blows, for the purpose
of compelling them to supply their wants by industry instead of supplying
them by rapine. These, together with some measures of general convenience,
are recognized as the principal legitimate spheres of government and the
regulation of the religious beliefs of the individual is nowhere mentioned
among them. The religious test clause and the clause against the establishment of a state church were therefore put into the Constitution to guard
the nation against many of the political crises which distracted the English
people from the reign of Henry the Eighth (1509-1547) until comparatively
recent times.
It will be remembered that during Henry's reign, the king assumed, after
his quarrel with the Pope, the latter's powers over the Catholic Church in
England. As a result of this move the theoretical head of the church and
the state became the same person, the King. Since that time religion has
played a conspicuous part in many of England's political struggles. Now a
Protestant ruler would be on the throne and then a Catholic would succeed

8

THE CHICAGO KENT REVIEW

him. The Protestant would endeavor to get his subjects as far away from
the Church of Rome as possible while the Catholic would endeavor to heal the
breach made by Henry's action. In any event legislation against non-conformist subjects (non-conforming to the King's own faith) would be one of
the principal things discussed upon the accession of a new ruler. In consequence of this so-called union of church and state under the executive branch
of the nation, men lost their political offices regardless of personal fitness,
their fortunes and not infrequently their lives, for no other reason than nonadherence to the king's belief in purely speculative matters. To separate
religion and politics and to keep the former out of consideration by the government, the Convention decreed that "no religious test shall ever be recognized as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States"
and that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Since no good reason has ever been
advanced why a man adhering to one faith cannot pe-form the duties of public
office and decide affairs of state as well as a man adhering to another, these
clauses are eminently beneficial in securing to the Federal Government the
talents of many intelligent persons who otherwise might be unnecessarily
excluded. This country in consequence has an ideal administration composed
of persons of all sects to govern a people of all sects and, what is more important, it has an egis against a prolific source of civil discord.
Habeas Corpus.
We come now to a consideration of the habeas corpus suspension clause
which, unlike the former clauses discussed, has both an historical and a practical interest. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is generally conceded to be the
greatest and most important remedy known to the law. As far back as the
time of the signing of Magna Charta (1215) there existed certain remedies
whereby a person unlawfully deprived of his liberty could be released from
restraint. During the period from Edward III (1326-1377) to the time of
Henry VII (1485-1509) the remedy analogous to our present one was generally held to be applicable only where one subject detained the person of
another subject and did not apply in cases where a subject was restrained of
his liberty by order of the king. In the reign of Henry VII the Writ was
used successfully even in cases of the latter class. From that time down to
the time of Charles I the constitutionality of the remedy was admitted but
in Charles' reign (1625-1649) certain judges in the Court of King's Bench held
the Writ inapplicable as against the order of the king. Such decisions were
mentioned as grievances in the memorable Petition of Rights (1628) addressed to Charles I. The first statute on the subject was passed in 1640 on
the eve of the great Rebellion but after the restoration of the House of
Stuart in 1660, when occasion arose the king, Charles 1I, by judges who
were his creatures, managed to evade it. Finally after the commitment of
one Jenkes by Charles' order in 1676 for an alleged turbulent speech, Parliament passed the now famous act by which the right was fully set forth
and secured and the means of obtaining it particularly described. This act
applied only to cases wherein the accused was charged with a crime but in the
reign of George III (1760-1820) the act was amended (1816) to provide relief
in all cases where a person was unlawfully deprived of his liberty.
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Granting to the general government, even in a restricted class of cases the
power to suspend this valuable right which took centuries to secure, was a
very serious matter with the citizens of the thirteen original states. The worth
of the right to the people at that time and the value placed on it by them are
evidenced by the storm of protest which broke loose against the suspension
clause when the Constitution was submitted for ratification. It gave no little
difficulty to its advocates in the Convention and in the debates which followed. There is now some agitation for a substantial curtailment of the
privileges given persons under the various acts in this country. It is to be
admitted that in the large centers of population some, or even we might say,
much abuse is made of the writ, yet, nevertheless the safety of many innocent
persons is secured against unreasonable detention by the operation of this

salutary remedy.
In conclusion it may be said that, since the rights briefly discussed here
are firmly placed in the supreme law of the land and since the controversies
out of which they arose are long since forgotten save by a few, one would
suppose all to be well as far as they are concerned but, unfortunately, such is
not the case. There are certain forces now at work (fostered no doubt by
well intentioned persons in most instances) attempting to undermine the very
instrument which secures them. We are not bigoted enough to say (as some
of its most ardent advocates do) that the Constitution of the United States
is well nigh perfect, infallible, and will never need correction to meet future
exigencies; or that a time will never come when it will be useless, but we do
say this: to abolish the Constitution and to set up another and untried form
of government without the rise of an emergency greater than any heretofore
encountered in our national history or to make any further amendments
thereto without full consideration of the expediency of so doing, would be
the height of political and social folly.
Every lawyer, every law student and every other citizen ought to make
some effort to understand the Constitution's history and to be familiar with
the principles underlying it, to the end that when alterations or an entire
change are deemed necessary intelligent discussions may be had concerning
them in place of the misapprehensions which are now so prevalent.

SENIORS STAGE RADIO DEBATE.
radio
debate to be held by Chicago-Kent College of Law took
second
The,
place on Friday, March 20, when two-seniors, Helmer Hansen and William
M. James, debated the question, "Resolved: that capital punishment should
be abolished." The debate was held at WMAQ, the Chicago Daily News
station. Hansen upheld the affirmative side of the question and James the
negative. While no decision was rendered, those who were on the air were
asked to mail in post cards voicing their sentiments. As yet the returns have
not been tabulated.

